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This article argues that the extent to which political office-holders can effectively attain and 
wield authority is a function of the stock of ‘leadership capital.’ Drawing on the concept of 
political capital, we define leadership capital as aggregate authority composed of three 
dimensions: skills; relations; and reputation of a leader. Leadership capital ebbs and flows 
over time within a trajectory of acquisition, expenditure and inevitable depreciation. We 
present a Leadership Capital Index (LCI) that systematically maps out the three broad areas 
combining concrete measures with interpretive aspects. This can be used as a tool for 
systematically tracking and comparing the political fortunes of leaders in a way that is both 
more nuanced and robust than exclusive reliance on the latest approval ratings. We offer an 
illustrative case study of Tony Blair demonstrating the LCI. We conclude by discerning 
several promising paths for future development of the LCI. 
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Political Leadership and Political Capital 
Political commentators routinely refer to political capital as the degree of popularity 
(measured usually through opinion polls or votes), mandate or momentum enjoyed by 
professional politicians and leaders. Politicians themselves often refer to political capital 
when comparing their capacity to mobilize people with others (Schugurensky 2000: 5; Schier 
2009). At a basic heuristic level the capital analogy allows us to understand the fundamental, 
but often overlooked, difference between office-holding and exercising leadership. Office-
holding is about gathering and conserving leadership capital, leading is about spending it 
purposefully whilst retaining enough to survive, recharge and continue. Exercising leadership 
involves laying one’s authority on the line to ‘teach reality’ (Hargrove 1998), to ‘disappoint 
followers at a rate they can stand’ (Heifetz, 1994), to ‘regulate distress’ among stakeholders 
and publics in order to get them to do the often painful ‘adaptive work’ involved in coping 
with complex changes and wicked problems, for which no leader or government can devise 
and impose ready-made solutions (Heifetz et al, 2009). What really counts is not one’s formal 
position but the informal authority one gets granted.  
With so much riding on it, it becomes relevant to be able to assess the state of a leader’s 
authority in a way that is valid and parsimonious and yet sensitive to its socially constructed 
and often fluid character. In this article we deploy an analogy from the world of finance and 
economics and conceive of political authority as ‘capital’, thus opening a different set of 
connotations and methodologies. Leadership capital is taken to be the aggregate of a leader’s 
political resources: skills (both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ see Nye 2008), relations and reputation. We 
first examine the theoretical roots of the concept. We then present three main forms of 
leadership capital, before introducing the Leadership Capital Index (LCI), discussing its use 
and demonstrating its application through an illustrative case study of Tony Blair’s second 
term in office. We conclude by outlining avenues for further application and development of 
the LCI.  
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Varieties of Capital  
Capital is recognised as ‘a surplus, something that you have beyond sufficiency that enables 
you to do something else of value’ (Renshon 2000: 203). Pierre Bourdieu conceptualised 
three fundamental guises of capital as: economic (money and property), cultural (cultural 
goods and services including educational credentials), and social (acquaintances and 
networks) (Bourdieu 1986: 242). The latter has spawned more than 4000 academic studies, 
largely on the back of Robert Putnam’s influential works, examining its measurement and 
effects (Campbell 2013: 29).  
Bourdieu (1986, 2005) also discerned political capital, a manifestation less developed than 
the other three forms of ‘capital’ he had initially presented. He described it as:   
A form of symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more 
precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or 
on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it) (in Schugurensky 2000: 
4). 
To Bourdieu the aim of political power is to ‘impose beliefs’ and ‘recognized principles’ 
(2005: 39). To do so, he explained, ‘one needs to be credible, to command credit, to have 
accumulated a capital of belief, of specific authority’ (Bourdieu 2005, 39, our emphasis). It 
also requires differentiation, to create a ‘distinctive, differential capital’ that allows the 
politician to stand out (2005: 39). To understand a politician’s position requires analysis of 
their background, their ‘relations of dependence’ with other powerful actors or groups and 
their ‘position in the political game’ whether a purist political actor, remote from the world or 
one connected to other ‘fields’ (2005: 34). Bourdieu highlights the ambiguous position of 
political capital as both symbolic and concrete power. Sometimes political capital is 
‘symbolic power ….an aggregate reflection of other capital forms possessed by powerful 
institutions and actors (meta-capital)’ while ‘elsewhere…it becomes something to be 
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accumulated as a capital form’ (Davis and Seymour 2010: 741). Notwithstanding this 
ambiguity, what is essential is that political capital is in part self-reinforcing (or self-
destructing) as ‘authority…comes in part from the effect that it produces’ (Bourdieu 2005: 
39).  
Bourdieu’s ideas enable us to identify three key points about the nature of political capital. 
First, having skills to become and remain a political leader is crucial. The process of 
leadership ascendancy begins as ‘individual politicians make use of their capital forms in 
order to win…struggles and progress within political hierarchies’ to achieve power, creating 
a  ‘distinctive’ image and path (Davis and Seymour 2010: 742; Bourdieu 2005: 39). It then 
follows that leadership consists of a ‘continuous…struggle’ to ‘maintain ascendancy’ (Davis 
and Seymour 2010: 741). 
Second, political capital is relational. Bourdieu saw ‘political power’ as being ‘derived by 
politicians from trust (expressed in a form of credit)’ from the public, though he viewed it as 
a capacity ‘to mobilise’ (Schugurensky 2000: 4). This connects political capital to public 
perceptions, with the media being a crucial linchpin between the two (Davis and Seymour 
2010: 742). Here a comparison can be again drawn with social capital, which is seen as a 
dense network of ‘credit’ (Coleman 1988), not unlike what novelist Tom Wolfe (1987) 
famously described as the ‘favor bank’: “Well, everything in this building . . . operates on 
favors. Everybody does favors for everybody else. Every chance they get, they make deposits 
in the Favor Bank.  A deposit in the Favor Bank is not a quid pro quo. It’s saving up for a 
rainy day…” So, relations and networks matter in the generation of political capital. 
Third, to Bourdieu low levels of public interest in the political process mean that political 
capital becomes an elite, leader and party centred pursuit with ‘politics…concentrated in the 
hands of professional politicians and bureaucrats, lead[ing] him to identify political capital 
only among political leaders or parties’ (Schugurensky 2000: 4). Once it is acquired, capital 
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becomes part of a reputational cycle, a reciprocal process of leaders presenting ideas, 
undertaking actions and ‘getting things done’. Political capital is thus continually ‘contested’ 
and fought over by the media, public and politicians. Political capital is dynamic and 
contingent and can ‘be conserved only at the cost of unceasing work which is necessary both 
to accumulate credit and to avoid discredit…before the tribunal of public opinion’ (Bourdieu, 
in Schugurensky 2000: 5; Davis and Seymour 2010: 742).  
Various interpretations of political capital have been offered. It has been theorised as a 
‘vertical’ version of ‘horizontal’ social capital or as a developing and dynamic relationship 
between politician and citizen (see Seyd and Whiteley 1997; Novicevic and Harvey 2004). 
We present a systemic tool drawn from such theoretical approaches. 
Leadership Capital 
It is important to differentiate between political capital and leadership capital. Political 
capital (as Bourdieu conceptualises above) is associated with horizontal bonds of networks, 
relations and trust that are inherited, hoarded, and often cultivated to gain vertical political 
credit. Leadership capital may draw on such horizontal foundations but it only applies to 
those in leadership positions. It is more focused on how constituents confer authority on a 
particular office-holder who then uses it. It evolves from and parallel with attributions 
associated with the personal qualities of these office-holders, i.e. their perceived 
‘competence, integrity and capacities for leadership’ (Renshon 2000: 200). Depending on 
how firmly and widely such perceptions are shared in a polity; the leadership capital of an 
office-holder can be ‘accumulated or depleted’ (ibid). As such, it is not a personal attribute of 
a leader, but a socially granted zone in which they can exercise leadership as defined above. 
John Kane (2001), for example, has tied a leader’s capital to the establishment of moral 
authority (Kane, 2001). In examining the political capital of George W. Bush, Schier (2009) 
defined capital as a combination of formal and informal power, a mix of ‘party support of the 
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president in Congress, public approval of the president’s conduct of his job, the President’s 
electoral margin and patronage appointments’ (Schier 2009: 5).  
The notion of leadership capital allows us to see the difference between being in office and 
being in power. In contemporary politics, leaders are held to be ever more centre stage, but 
also more constrained and vulnerable (Helms 2012b: 660). Executive leadership studies have 
tended to focus on the power mechanisms that structure the governance environment within 
which leaders operate. Such formal mechanisms may include the ability to hire and fire, 
formal constitutional powers, the capacity to organise at the centre and the level of 
administrative support (Rockman 1997, 2003; Rose 1980, 2005, Peters and Helms 2012). The 
institutional context will differ and be dependent on the type of system. Presidents may have 
extensive patronage powers, but as in the United States they have to compete with a well 
funded and autonomous legislature. Prime ministers in coalition may be constrained by 
electoral mechanisms and power sharing agreements, as in most West European countries.  
Studying political leadership through the lens of leadership capital presumes that it is the 
dynamic interplay between individual capabilities and contextual conditions that shapes 
leaders’ ability to act and determines their legacies (Hargrove 2002: 199; Hargrove and Owen 
2003). Also, political psychologists have discovered that some leaders’ personality 
characteristics predispose them to accept contextual constraints as given, whereas others are 
more predisposed to challenge them (Keller, 2005; Antonakis 2011; Davis and Gardner 
2012). Yet situations are never a given. Things happening ‘out there’ are perceived and 
understood differently by political actors: ‘the economy’, ‘the Zeitgeist’ or ‘the geostrategic 
situations’ are assigned meaning in media stories which are framed in particular ways - often 
with strategic intent. Such meaning-making contests are pivotal in mediating the effects of 
situations upon leaders’ capital (see Skowronek 1993, 2010; ‘t Hart and Uhr 2011; Laing and 
McCaffrie 2013; ‘t Hart 2014). The view of these narratives themselves may also shift over 
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time: Thatcher and Reagan’s ‘pro- free market small state’ narrative is viewed differently 
post 2007 crash than it was in the boom years of the late 1990s. The combination of skills, 
relations and reputation offers a way into understanding this.  
Institutional parameters vary, as can the situational context within which the leader must 
operate. Elgie (1995) sensibly proposed an interactionist approach, combining the personal 
and systemic aspects of the leadership process, whereby political leaders operate within an 
environment ‘which will both structure their behaviour and constrain their freedom of 
action’. This implies that ‘political leaders do have the opportunity to shape the environment 
in which they operate’ (Helms 2005), or as Riker (1986: ix) put it ‘structuring situations so 
you can win’ only when the leadership environment actually allows such restructuring (see 
Greenstein, 1969; Hargrove and Owens, 2003). But to do so, they need not just skills but 
authority, conceived of here as a warrant to challenge and alter institutional traditions and 
path dependencies. Leadership capital provides a measure for what one might call the 
‘aggregate authorisation’ a political actor enjoys from his ‘authorizing environment’ (Moore, 
1995), in other words a composite measure of their warrant to lead. Having a healthy ‘stock’ 
of leadership capital confers on leaders the power to sway decision-making processes, to 
persuade publics and to convene, stakeholders otherwise reluctant to engage in dialogue. In 
short, it enhances their ability to confront and resolve dilemmas (Renshon 2000: 223). 
Figure 1: Components of Leadership Capital 
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Figure 1 offers a breakdown of the constituent parts of leadership capital. Skills capital refers 
to the perceived personal competences of a leader, e.g. their cognitive, physical, 
communicative and managerial capacity. Political psychologists who study the impact of 
personality on leadership reminds us that ‘who leads matters’. For example, US presidential 
scholar Fred Greenstein (2010) distinguished six key skill areas of leadership style to 
describe and diagnose the performance of the holders of that office. Greenstein’s categories 
provide useful shorthand for comparing and contrasting the personal styles of different 
political leaders, and not just US presidents (Daleus, 2012). His effort is just one among 
many who have tried to capture key dimensions of politicians’ leadership styles and skills and 
to develop them into predictive and/or evaluative performance assessment instruments 
(Kaarbo, 1997; Preston, 2001; Cronin 2008; Post, 2005; Hermann, 2013; see also Nye, 2008).  
What really matters is the competencies that are projected on to leaders by their authorizing 
environment: the actors and institutions whose support is essential for them to maintain the 
ability to lead. The nature and scope of these authorizing environments varies across political 
systems and situations. It may include any or all of the following: the armed forces, media 
owners and editors, party barons, key industrialists, trade union elites, voters in marginal 
seats, celebrity endorsers, and so on. The nature of the mix varies across time and space. 
What is crucial for reaching and consolidating leadership positions are perceptions of a 
Leadership 
Capital 
s1 Skills 
(Soft) 
s2 Skills 
(Hard) 
r1  
Relations 
R2 
Reputation 
9 
 
leader’s skills, here pragmatically separated into ‘hard’ (unilateral and transactional) and 
‘soft’ (persuasive and inspirational) skills (Nye 2008: 83).  
Relational capital refers to the loyalties that leaders mobilise. Why people follow or at least 
accept that leaders matters a great deal in shaping the authority and influence of leaders. 
Some leader-constituent relationships are characterized by fierce, unconditional and enduring 
loyalty. In case of charismatic leadership, constituents become fully formed ‘followers’ 
whose loyalty is unconditional, indeed ‘blind’ (Davis and Gardner 2012, Aviolo and 
Yammarino 2013). Other leader-follower relationships are much more cerebral, contingent 
and ephemeral. Understanding leadership, in other words, involves grasping the ‘dynamic 
interplay of wants, needs, motives, values, and capacities of both would-be leaders and their 
potential followers’ (Burns 2003: 16). Social psychology and sociology provide a rich 
reservoir of insights about the composition, social categorizations and identifications, and 
leadership expectations of followers and constituents. These are key to understanding the 
nature of the psychological contract that develops between them and their representatives 
(Cronin 2008; Reicher et al, 2010). This contract extends beyond the circle of party members 
or movement followers. It can also be usefully applied to capture the relations between 
leaders and the media and the wider electorate (Davis 2010). 
Leadership relations differ in the kind of psychological contract that underpins them. Burns 
(1978) picked up on this in making his classic distinction between transformational and 
transactional leaders, but by now there are many other salient distinctions (Brett 2009; 
Reicher et al 2014). The ‘visionary’, transformational leader first and foremost hopes to 
gather capital through a mobilizing story of ideals and aspirations, and is prepared to risk the 
political costs of ideological opposition to it and of delivered realities falling short of evoked 
expectations. In contrast, pragmatic, transactional leaders bank primarily on acquiring capital 
through technical competence and tangible achievements at the risk of leaving a vacuum of 
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meaning and identification for their political competitors to fill. This stylistic divide cuts 
across holders of the same political office. 
 
Each type of leadership claim sets up its own performance test. Moralizing leaders need ‘to 
walk their talk’. Idealist leaders need to be seen to be taking risks and making sacrifices for 
the values they believe in. Pragmatists need to demonstrate competence and ‘bring home the 
bacon’. This brings us to the third component: reputational capital. Leaders’ words and 
deeds are constantly monitored and assessed. Followers, observers and critics alike all try to 
distil a ‘narrative’ about what a leader ‘is really like’ from the pattern of that leader’s 
behaviour and its observable impact. For each leader such a narrative emerges. Though only 
partially shaped and controlled by the leader herself. This narrative forms the core of a 
leader’s reputation. A leader’s reputation increases leadership capital when it meets two 
conditions: its normative core is seen by the observer as appropriate for the times; and the gap 
between perceived promise and observed performance is seen as limited or caused by 
exogenous, temporary circumstances. Effective reputations are coherent believable narratives 
in which a leader’s life story, espoused philosophy and observable in-office behaviour are 
widely deemed to be in alignment. 
 
The Leadership Capital Index 
The Leadership Capital Index (LCI) is a diagnostic ‘checklist’ tool for assessing a political 
leader’s ‘stock’ of authority. It is designed to help us spot key variations in the nature and 
aggregate volume of leadership capital. It can be applied to discrete leaders, but also in a 
comparative, ‘league table’ fashion. It offers a ‘snap shot’ at a particular point or period, but 
when applied repeatedly over the course of a leader’s tenure, it helps document the ebb and 
flow of their authority over time. The index is conceptualised as the sum of the ‘scores’ 
leaders achieve on the three elements presented above: skills, relations and reputation. The 
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LCI merges perceptual categories with observable performance data (e.g. electoral and 
legislative record).  
The LCI assesses leadership authority as an aggregate of (perceived) skills, relations and 
reputation. The point of the exercise is that the LCI has the potential to generate a more 
nuanced picture of a leader’s ‘license to operate’, both in time and over time, than the 
common job approval and poll ratings are able to provide. Users of the index can decide 
whether and how to accord weights to each of these three criteria sets. Table 1 offers one way 
of operationalising  the LCI. The indicators were chosen by a process of reduction, distilling 
a vast array of variables often used to assess political leadership down to a manageable 
number of ten core indicators. The variables relate to the three aspects of leadership capital 
defined above. Some act as ‘proxies’ to assess electoral skill. This underpins the Index with a 
level of coherence and parsimony. Most indicators relate to a perceptual element and thus 
involve either public opinion / constituent data, or require some form of intersubjective 
agreement among analysts (e.g. by using expert panels or parallel coding).  
Table 1. The Leadership Capital Index of a Political Party Leader  
Criteria Indicators Measurements 
S1 01 Political/policy vision 1. Completely absent 
2. Unclear/inconsistent 
3. Moderately clear/consistent 
4. Clear/consistent 
5. Very clear/consistent 
S1 02 Communicative 
performance 
1. Very poor 
2. Poor 
3. Average  
4. Good 
5. Very good 
S2 03 Personal poll rating 
relative to rating at most 
recent election  
1. Very low (<-15%) 
2. Low (-5 to -15%) 
3. Moderate (-5% to 5%) 
4. 1-5 
5. 5-10 
S2 04 Longevity: time in office 1. <1 year 
2. 1 – 2 years 
3. 2 – 3 years 
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4. 3 - 4 years 
5. >4 years 
S2 05 (Re)election margin for 
the party leadership  
1. Very small (<1% of relevant electors, 
i.e. caucus, party members) 
2. Small (1-5%) 
3. Moderate (5-10%) 
4. Large (10-15%) 
5. Very large (>15%) 
R1 06 Party polling relative to 
most recent election result 
1. <-10% 
2. -10% to-2.5% 
3. -2.5% to 2.5% 
4. 2.5% to 10% 
5. >10% 
R1 07 Levels of public trust in 
leader 
1. 0-20% 
2. 20-40% 
3. 40-60% 
4. 60-80% 
5. 80-100% 
R1 08 Likelihood of credible 
leadership challenge within 
next 6 months 
1. Very low 
2. Low 
3. Moderate 
4. High 
5. Very high 
R2 09 Perceived ability to 
shape party’s policy 
platform  
1. Very low 
2. Low 
3. Moderate 
4. High 
5. Very high 
R2 10 Perceived parliamentary 
effectiveness 
1.     Very low 
2.     Low 
3.     Moderate 
4.     High 
5.     Very high 
 
Where data is limited or unavailable, it may be that other proxies are used such as approval 
rating for trust. Once the analysis is undertaken, the data can then be ‘scored’ to allow a 
rating of a leader on the LCI. A provisional overall interpretive assessment is given in Table 
2 with illustrative examples leaders arguably fitting into the various categories. 
Table 2: Aggregating and interpreting LCI scores 
Ratings  Description Examples  
0-10 Depleted capital: edge of removal or ‘lame 
duck’ 
Australian Labor Party 
leader and Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard (2010-13) in 
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the 9 months prior to her 
removal.   
11-20 Low capital: ‘politically weakened’ but still 
capable of some action 
British PM John Major, 
(1990-97) in face of 
intraparty rebellion over EU 
policy post the 1992 
election.  
21-30 Medium capital: ‘muddling through’ in the face 
of significant obstacles and divisions, yet with 
provisional license to operate from ( a small 
majority within) the authorizing environment 
Swedish social-democratic 
party leader and prime 
minister Goran Persson 
Sweden (1996-2006). 
31-40 High capital: ‘momentum’ derived from robust 
political performance and party cohesion  
 Spanish social-democratic 
leader and prime minister 
Felipe Gonzalez (1982-
1996), particularly in his 
first two terms.  
41-50 Exceptional capital: ‘political weather maker’ 
boosted by electoral landslide, and/or personal 
dominance and/or ‘good crises to have’  
 US Republican Party leader 
and president George W. 
Bush (2001-2008) following 
the September 11 attacks, 
until a few months into the 
2003 invasion of Iraq. 
 
The LCI is not a panacea for the chronic problems of ‘measuring’ something so complex and 
contingent as authority. It involves trade-offs in several areas. First, between ease of use and 
comprehensiveness and, second, between the measurement of ‘hard’ empirical (often polling) 
and ‘soft’ interpretive (often expert), assessment (see Greenstein 2010). The LCI takes a 
mixed methods approach, blending the two types of measures and merging the 5 ‘hard’ 
empirical measures based on empirical data with 5 more ‘soft’ or interpretive assessments 
based on expert opinion (see table 3 below). Mixed methods continue to be utilised as an 
emerging approach or paradigm (Bergman 2010: Hesse-Biber and Johnson 2013). Read and 
Marsh (2002) in particular point out the requirement for a clear ‘lead’ between the two types 
when using mixed methods; the LCI offers an index driven by the hard measures impacting 
on the soft. The cycle is then reciprocal as positive outcomes are in turn led by the soft 
analysis (see discussion below). Moreover, measures can be combined as, for example, 
parliamentary rebellions require reading beyond the numbers.  
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Table 3: Sources of LCI Measurement 
Criteria Indicators Measure 
S1 01 Political/policy vision Soft (expert) 
S1 02 Communicative performance Soft (expert) 
S2 03 Personal poll rating relative to rating at 
most recent election  
Hard (polling) 
S2 04 Longevity: time in office Hard 
(chronology) 
S2 05 (Re)election margin for the party 
leadership  
Hard (vote count) 
R1 06 Party polling relative to most recent 
election result 
Hard (polling) 
R1 07 Levels of public trust in leader Hard (polling) 
R1 08 Likelihood of credible leadership 
challenge within next 6 months 
Soft (expert) 
R2 09 Perceived ability to shape party’s policy 
platform  
Soft (expert) 
R2 10 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness Soft (expert) 
 
While Bourdieu pointed out that it is skills that allow politicians to rise, it is only through the 
‘hard’ results of elections won and opinion leads that leaders can fully deploy their skills, use 
their relations and build their reputation. The case study of Tony Blair that follows was 
chosen as a starting point to test and develop the theory. While Blair is in some senses 
atypical, as a very long serving prime minister within a strongly leader centric system, his 
case offers the chance to explore and develop the LCI through a series of snapshots of his 
second term. The case is used in an exploratory sense to test and develop the LCI and 
accompanying theory (Gerring 2004). 
 
As with the ‘natural rate of governability’ some of the subjective measures are context-
dependent (Buller and James 2012; Bulpitt 1986). What are considered assets (skills, 
achievements or victories) in one setting may not be in another setting. This may vary from 
person to person or group to group: Renshon (2000: 208) speaks of there being not one but 
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‘several’ public ‘psychologies’ assessing leaders. Renshon (2000: 207) argues that building 
capital is not all catch-all race for the widest support: one leader as a unifier (a Churchill) 
may build capital through widening ‘national’ support: others (a Thatcher) may do so through 
division and strengthening a ‘core’ support of particular groups..  
 
Utilising and Interpreting the Leadership Capital Index 
Much work is still required to develop alternative and complementary operationalisations of 
the LCI for different classes of political office-holders (heads of government, ministers, 
opposition leaders, senior legislators). Whilst the LCI presents a potential starting point for 
new approaches to understanding and evaluating political leadership, it is worth reflecting a 
little more on the potential applications of LCI-based analyses in the study of political 
leadership.  
The trajectory of leadership capital 
Leadership capital can be assessed as a snapshot (at time T) or as a film (trajectory T1->Tx 
with various markers in between T2, T3, T4 etc). The latter opens up the opportunity for 
empirical testing of the long-established assertion that leadership tenures follow roughly three 
developmental stages: acquiring, managing, and losing leadership capital (Breslauer, 2002: 
13). Each leadership trajectory is said to evolve through these stages, though not necessarily 
in linear or predictable fashion. Leadership capital gathering requires a struggle to the top, as 
with Bourdieu’s political capital. Acquiring enough leadership capital to obtain high office is 
just the start. Capital must thus be leveraged to ‘make a difference’ in public policy while one 
can. It takes time, skill and luck to accumulate (Davis and Seymour 2010). That being the 
case, leaders can only spend it every so often. However, unlike financial capital, which 
prudent managers can sustain over very long periods of time, political leaders experience 
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growing tension between their desire to lead and the near-inevitable growing downward 
pressure on their capital.   
Leaders may score highly in the daily battle, but lose in the long-term: Gordon Brown was 
famously a tactician, spending capital day-to-day to ‘win’ but failed to deploy it strategically 
(Seldon and Lodge 2010). Australian Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam articulated one 
of the most ambitious and far-reaching policy visions in recent memory for his 1972 
government, but squandered the capital it conferred in three years through inept management 
of the day-to-day governmental process (Walter 1980). Time has a way of dumping the 
occasional fiasco, scandal or external crisis on a leader’s doorstep. These provide high-stakes 
performance tests and ‘blame games’ at an altogether different level of intensity, which will 
see some leaders thrive and others flounder (Boin et al, 2005, 2008).  
Nuances aside, the iron law of democratic politics is that even great political skills and 
propitious political and economic contexts cannot halt the inevitable (though not monotonous 
or steep) decline of a leader’s authority. The natural ‘trajectory’ of leadership capital is one of 
eventual deprecation: even those office-holders who seek to hoard it, tend to see it severely 
diminished in the end – with media, former allies, party barons, organised interests and voters 
deciding the time has come for them to move on. The tension between hoarding and spending 
capital and the impact of what one might call the natural rate of capital attrition over time 
becomes progressively more difficult to manage, to the point that a very large percentage of 
all democratic party and government leaders are forced one way or the other to leave office 
before they themselves feel ready (Laing and ‘t Hart 2011). Denver and Garnett’s (2012: 71) 
meta-analysis of opinion polling data found ‘it is certainly the case that all prime ministers 
leave office less popular then when they began. Most have ups and downs… but in the end 
the trend is inexorably downwards’. An ideal typical depiction of this trajectory would 
present an arc of leadership capital, within which the LCI may be plotted over the leadership 
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tenure, as ascendance precedes performance, and eventual political decline. The evolution of 
leadership capital can be identified along the lines therefore of an inverted U trajectory (‘t 
Hart and Bynander 2006: 722). 
As noted above, the LCI can be utilised to plot the diachronic trajectory of various leader to 
test whether this general assertion is correct, who might be exempt from it, as well as to 
explore if there are typical patterns of leadership capital evolution. The next step in the 
analysis is then to explore the correlates or ideally the causes of such variations. From a 
short- term perspective strong leadership capital should enable leaders both to momentarily 
survive in office and exercise effective leadership (i.e. putting hitherto neglected issues on 
the political agenda, getting major policy changes adopted or delivering institutional 
reforms). From a long-term perspective on office-holding, high levels of leadership capital 
should be associated with a lack of internal competitors, low levels of intraparty factionalism, 
stable and robust legislative majorities, successful re-election and thus long lasting leaders 
tenures.  
Using the LCI: The example of Tony Blair, June 2001 – May 2005  
To demonstrate the applicability of the LCI, the following analysis examines Tony Blair as 
Prime Minister in his second term between June 2001 and May 2005. The work uses hard 
data combined with insights from biography and autobiography.  
Blair regarded his first term from 1997-2001 as ‘wasted’ and the second as his chance to 
radically reform Britain (Kavanagh 2005). He began with a second landslide of 167 seats, 
very high poll ratings, economic stability and large amounts of ‘goodwill’ (Kavanagh 2005). 
The LCI measures Blair’s capital in 2001, 2003 and 2005 to over a series of snapshots of his 
position and explain his successes and failures over this time.  
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Blair offers a particularly fruitful area. Not only is there voluminous assessment of his time in 
office and legacy but also detailed studies of his parliamentary party (Cowley 2005), media 
perceptions and trust (Karp et al 2011: 2012) his own autobiography (Blair 2010) and 
academic and popular research into his legacy (Bennister 2009, 2012; Theakston 2012). The 
approach taken here is not intended to be prescriptive, but offers an example of a way in 
which it can be done.    
Table 3: LCI Measure of Tony Blair 2001-2005  
Criteria Indicators Measurements Sources and summary 
S1 01 Political/policy 
vision 
1. Completely absent 
2. Unclear/inconsistent 
3. Moderately 
clear/consistent 
4. Clear/consistent 
5. Very 
clear/consistent 
 
Blair’s ‘radical’ reforming vision 
was disrupted by Iraq in 2003 but 
gained clarity in 2004-5. 
2001 4 
2003  3 
2005   3   
S1 02 
Communicative 
performance 
1. Very poor 
2. Poor 
3. Average  
4. Good 
5. Very good 
Blair remained a very strong 
communicator but the effect of his 
performances lost traction with the 
decline in trust and credibility. 
2001 5 
2003  4 
2005   4  
S2 03 Personal poll 
rating relative to 
opposition leader  
1. Very low (<-15%) 
2. Low (-5 to -15%) 
3. Moderate (-5% to 
5%) 
4. 1-5 
5. 5-10 
Blair’s poll rating began high and 
declined sharply over Iraq. 
Despite the drop Blair remained 
ahead of his three successive 
opposition rivals. 
2001 5 
2003  2 
2005  3 
S2 04 Longevity: 
time in office 
1. <1 year 
2. 1 – 2 years 
3. 2 – 3 years 
4. 3 - 4 years 
5. >4 years 
Blair’s time in office 1997-2001 
gave him experience and a 
‘stronger centre’. 
All 5   
S2 05 (Re)election 
margin for the 
party leadership  
1. Very small (<1% of 
relevant electors, 
i.e. caucus, party 
members) 
2. Small (1-5%) 
3. Moderate (5-10%) 
4. Large (10-15%) 
Election margin from 1994 was 
strong but increasingly irrelevant.  
All 5 
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5. Very large (>15%) 
R1 06 Party polling 
relative to most 
recent election 
result 
1. <-10% 
2. -10% to-2.5% 
3. -2.5% to 2.5% 
4. 2.5% to 10% 
5. >10% 
The Labour party lost support but 
remained ahead of the 
Conservatives for most of the 
time. 
All 2  
R1 07 Levels of 
public trust in 
leader 
1. 0-20% 
2. 20-40% 
3. 40-60% 
4. 60-80% 
5. 80-100% 
Though beginning with high levels 
of trust, Blair faced a crisis of 
personal trust/credibility by 2003, 
stemming from Iraq, that 
worsened by 2005.  
2001 3 
2003  2 
2005   2  
R1 08 Likelihood of 
credible 
leadership 
challenge within 
next 6 months 
1. Very  High 
2.  High 
3. Moderate 
4. Low 
5. Very Low 
The ‘duarchy’ with Brown grew 
increasingly acrimonious, creating 
a dysfunctional and factionalised 
government and divided party. 
This limited Blair’s control of his 
party and policy.  
2001 2 
2003 1 
2005  1 
R2 09 Perceived 
ability to shape 
party’s policy  
1. Very low 
2. Low 
3. Moderate 
4. High 
5. Very high 
Blair’s ‘radical’ aims translated 
into concrete but underwhelming 
achievements. By 2003 Iraq 
undermined other domestic and 
foreign initiatives while Brown 
effectively vetoed Blair’s wish to 
join the Euro. Blair began to 
develop a clearer policy agenda 
2004-5.  
2001 5 
2003 2 
2005  3  
R2 10 Perceived 
parliamentary 
effectiveness 
1.     Very low 
2.     Low 
3.     Moderate 
4.     High 
5.     Very high 
Despite his majority of 167 seats 
Blair found it increasingly difficult 
to control his rebellious party from 
2002-3 onwards, culminating in a 
series of rebellions including the 
largest in modern times over Iraq. 
2001  5 
2003   2 
2005   2   
 
S1 Vision and Communication 
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Blair was widely recognised during his premiership as a ‘transformist’ in vision (Hennessy 
2001; Seldon 2005). In 2001, Blair promised a ‘radical’ second term that included far-
reaching public service reform, democratic renewal and taking the UK into the Euro (Seldon 
2005: 466-467). It became clear that Blair, lacked a ‘concise agenda’ and had a tendency to 
become a ‘crisis manager and headline seeker’ (Kavanagh 2005: 16). Moreover, Blair was 
also blown off course by the War on Terror and, ultimately, Iraq, the event that 
‘overshadowed and distracted’ his vision and estranged him from his own party and the 
public (see Hill 2005, 408: Buller and James 2012). However, he began to develop a more 
distinct ‘choice and diversity’ agenda across public services in 2004-5 (Seldon 2005). His late 
commitment to a referendum (without consulting colleagues) on the EU treaty can be seen as 
a final attempt to wrest the initiative and push bold policy (Riddell 2005). 
Blair retained a ‘remarkable capacity to communicate’ (Kavanagh 2005: 18) in set pieces and 
in impromptu settings, using his skills to build narratives on public service reform in 2002 or 
foreign aid in 2005. His skills were used most in evidence in his attempt to persuade the party 
and public over the War in Iraq in 2002-03 (Bennister 2012; Seldon 2005: 698). However, his 
abilities may have acted to over-inflate his self-belief- even in 2005 Blair felt, against polling 
evidence, he could ‘persuade’ the electorate on an EU referendum (Riddell 2005).  
S2 Polling, Longevity and Election  
In polling terms both Blair and his party experienced a ‘long, slow but seemingly inexorable 
slide into unpopularity’ (Bennister 2012:174; Powell 2010: 139). The crucial period was 
2003-04 when the deteriorating situation in Iraq dragged down both Blair and the party. 
However, the poor ratings of the Conservative opposition leaders, William Hague, Iain 
Duncan Smith and then Michael Howard, meant Blair remained consistently ahead of his 
opponents-he outpolled them by an average of 14.2 points with his highest 32 point lead in 
2001 and lowest of 3 in 2005 (UK Polling Report 2011).  At the start of his second term Blair 
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had ‘learned much’ in his first five years and he and his team were ‘seasoned’, aided by a 
‘stronger centre’ and growing institutional capacity (Kavanagh 2005). Yet his ‘lack of 
strategy’, informal decision making habits and conflict with Brown were also set as 
dysfunctional patterns (Seldon 2005). His election as party leader was 11 years in the past 
and largely irrelevant, especially given the growing challenge from Brown (Kelly et al 2010)  
R1 Polling, Trust and Challenge   
The Labour party dropped an average of around 10 points between the General Elections of 
2001 and 2005. However, the Conservative opposition remained behind by average of 6 
percentage points, only pulling ahead briefly to +4 in the ‘nadir’ of 2004 (UK Polling Report 
2005).  
Iraq was central to the decline of Blair’s personal credibility, which bled away from 2003 
onwards (Hill 2005). As of 2004 more than 50 per cent of polled respondents were against 
continued military action (Yougov 2013). By 2005 65 per cent of the public did not trust 
Blair to tell the truth, with 72 per cent citing the fact he ‘spins too much’ and 54 per cent that 
he lied to take Britain into war in Iraq (YouGov 2005). Blair’s integrity was continuously 
questioned by the Conservative press from 2003 onwards (see Stevens and Karp 2012). Yet 
his opponents fared little better-while 54 per cent distrusted Blair in 2003 40 per cent 
distrusted Conservative leader Iain Duncan Smith (Populus 2003).  
One of the essential components of any assessment of Blair’s capital is the strength of an 
alternate challenger. Chancellor Gordon Brown ‘agreed’ in 1994 to stand aside from the 
leadership contest in exchange for the Premiership after Blair, which Brown believed would 
be some time in the second term (Kavanagh 2005). Between 2001 and 2005 the two men 
effectively ran the government as a ‘joint premiership’ or duarchy, with Brown holding sway 
over domestic policy (Seldon 2007: 337: Kavanagh 2005). Relations deteriorated severely in 
the second term, creating a deeply divided government, fragmented into warring factions and 
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party loyalty moving to Brown (Kavanagh 2005). By 2004-05 Blair felt that the Labour Party 
saw him as an ‘albatross’ and felt they could ‘renew under Brown’ (2010: 510-511). Blair’s 
promise in September 2004 not to challenge another election after 2005 was intended to 
create space for his own achievements (Blair 2010).  
R2 Policy and Parliament  
Blair’s promises of radicalism were seen to fall short. Although manifesto commitments were 
met and NHS and higher education reforms and poverty reduction were clear markers of 
success, much of the responsibility lay with Brown (Buller and James 2012, 18). Promised 
democratic renewal was undermined by ‘muddy planning’ and ‘poor execution’ of 
constitutional reform (Seldon 2005: 421). Significantly, Brown effectively vetoed Blair’s 
central aim of UK entry into the Euro in 2003 (Riddell 2005).  
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the defining moment of Blair’s loss of capital, as Blair 
placed a series of ‘bets’ that went ‘wrong’ (Hill 2005: 296). The invasion and subsequent 
violence fed back negatively into Blair’s personal credibility, party relations and policy 
influence. His subsequent attempts to advance action on climate change, Middle East peace 
and develop a stronger influence in the EU were all undermined by his diminished reputation 
and over-reliance on the US (Hill 2005). 
Despite Blair’s 167 seat majority, his control of Parliament also slipped away from 2003 
onwards. Labour MPs rebelled in the House of Commons 259 times in 20.8 per cent of votes, 
culminating in the largest rebellion in modern history over military action in Iraq in March 
2003, an event dangerous enough for Blair to draft a resignation statement (Cowley and 
Stuart 2005: 23). These rebellions continued and, indeed, intensified towards 2004-2005 
(Cowley 2005). In an interesting case of unintended consequences, the unelected House of 
Lords, empowered by Blair’s removal of its hereditary element in 1999, defeated the 
government twice as often as the first term on a range of important issues from the judiciary 
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to NHS reform, immigration and anti-terrorism powers (Cowley and Stuart 2005: 39). 
Although the defeats rarely seriously hampered the government, they led to policy shifts and 
were ‘politically costly’ in symbolic terms and ‘self-perpetuating’ in encouraging further 
rebellion (Cowley and Stuart 2005: 41). 
Blair: The Analysis   
Few second term governments ‘enhance their reputation’ as support becomes ‘stale’ and 
opposition increases (Kavanagh 2005: 3; Norris 2005: 44). Nevertheless, Blair began his term 
with almost perfect conditions for a ‘weather-making’ premiership with a ‘large majority, 
goodwill, economic stability and a ‘feeble opposition’: few leaders have had a more 
‘favourable context’ (Kavanagh 2005: 19; Buller and James 2012: 18). Yet Blair’s capital 
declined sharply in 2003 and only slightly revived. 
Table 4: A Snapshot of Blair’s Leadership Capital June 2001, June 2003 and May 2005   
Year LCI score 
2001 41  
2003 28  
2004 30 
 
The LCI helps to demonstrate the pattern of Blair’s loss. He begins on 41 with ‘exceptional’ 
amounts of capital and then suffers a deep loss to a medium ‘muddling through’ level. He 
then recovers slightly to the border of ‘medium’ and ‘high’. Blair’s lowest point came in 
2003, with Brown’s Euro ‘veto’ and the series of rebellions on Iraq apparently removing 
Blair’s control of his party and policy. 
In examining the loss of leadership capital, it is clear that Iraq is the key event, comparable 
with Thatcher’s poll tax. Iraq undermined Blair’s skills, meaning his strong communicative 
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skills had declining effect on a sceptical public and unhappy party. It also strengthened his 
restive challenger. Blair’s weakness over Iraq was intertwined with the ‘Blair/Brown 
division’ which split policy into ‘fiefdoms’ and had a ‘fundamental impact’ on Blair’s ability 
to govern (Richards 2011: 35-36).  Brown’s challenge and status as ‘leader-in-waiting’ was 
strengthened by Iraq, as Blair admitted (Blair 2010: 511).   
The loss was also down to Blair himself. Blair believed he retained more power than he did: 
Barber claimed that Blair felt that ‘through the exercise of his own formidable powers of 
persuasion, he could achieve almost anything’ (Barber 2007, 305). His poor strategy and lack 
of detailed planning further limited his ability to reform: he had ‘failed to work out what to 
do’ with his second term until late (Seldon 2005, 423-424: Kavanagh 2005). His choices of 
supporters and allies also worked against him, domestically by 2005 there were only two 
‘Blairites’ in Cabinet and on foreign policy his reliance on the US and Israel to move forward 
peace negotiations or climate change (Seldon 2007).     
A more difficult question is how Blair regained parts of his capital towards 2005. Blair 
undoubtedly became more focused later in the second term and, as a consequence, pushed a 
series of, at least partially successful, bold domestic and foreign policy initiatives late in 
2004-2005 from action on climate change to the creation of a Supreme Court (Cowley 2005). 
Yet Blair’s key ‘strength’ was one of fortune: the weakness of the Conservative opposition, 
which had ‘flat-lined’ and remained in ‘disarray’ throughout the second term (Norris 2007, 
45). Better opposition leaders could have offered an alternative narrative and better exploited 
Blair’s weaknesses: both the Iraq rebellion or Euro u-turn, instead of offering a chance to 
severely ‘damage’ Blair, also exposed Conservative divisions (Cowley 2005).  
While academics agree Iraq undermined Blair’s leadership, the LCI demonstrates how. It 
triggered a self-reinforcing ‘chain reaction’ across Blair’s skills, relations and reputation. 
Blair himself acknowledges that the party was rebellious partly because of the strength of his 
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rival and partly because of Iraq (Blair 2010). Blair’s policy-making was then hampered both 
domestically and abroad by both the growing dysfunction and in-fighting and the 
deteriorating situation in the Middle East, weakening Blair’s control and reputation among 
his own party, colleagues and internationally (Hill 2005). Distrust among the public then fed 
back into party unhappiness. The ‘negative’ capital diminishing forces locked-into and 
reinforcing one another.   
So what kept Blair in power? His skills, structural advantage and poor opposition-though 
each was isolated and could not positively feedback. His personal skills remained, though 
they diminished because they lacked traction among a sceptical public and party. Blair’s 
majority was a great structural advantage, though also subject to diminishing returns due to 
rebellion. Most importantly, Blair was sustained by a poor and less popular opposition. It was 
perhaps the latter factor that allowed Blair to regain capital-giving him the space to fall in 
popularity, weather rebellions and the opportunity to ‘promise’ to ‘stand down’, that gave 
him the time and space to push a new agenda and seek, with some success, to pass new 
policies. Seldon’s (2007) claim that Blair was a ‘late developer’, who ‘bucked the trend’ of 
Prime Ministers in early achievement and late decay, is only partially true (xiv). In fact, the 
LCI shows that Blair’s second term is more nuanced and interesting, moving from huge 
(unspent) credit to steep loss and partial regain. 
Conclusions 
The LCI opens up several promising research opportunities. First, the various components of 
the framework need to be tested and extended. For example, there could be closer study of 
aspects of perceptions of political skills or trust and how they link to other parts of the LCI: 
the case of Blair showed an interesting ‘chain reaction’ of one shift of the LCI impacting 
upon the other (Brown as rival triggered rebellions and disloyalty, further weakening Blair’s 
ability to ‘get things done’). Existing data sources on political leadership need to be mined 
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and new ones established where necessary. Furthermore, the LCI provokes the question how 
is capital acquired and how is it then translated into performative capital once in office. There 
is also the issue of levels of leadership capital: how much capital is enough for leaders to 
survive, and become a consequential leader? There is a finite amount of capital that any 
leader is granted, but is there a tipping point - a point of no return? This further begs the 
question - in what situations can it be spent and how? If leadership capital can be indexed to 
what extent does it behave as financial capital does? There may be an analogous aspect to 
capital acquisition, but leadership capital cannot be hoarded. Capital maintenance is a 
constant struggle and one ‘locked in’ to an arc of decreasing power and authority. There may 
therefore be a case for looking at the idea of ‘investing capital’ in the long term into 
particular projects, drawing on recent work on ‘political investments’ (see Bertelli and John 
2011). A leader may ‘invest’ their stock in a particular programme over a long timeframe that 
may not immediately see a political ‘return’. This could be an attempt to restructure the 
economy or society in some fundamental way or involve the reorientation of the values of a 
society. 
Second, the LCI needs broader application and scrutiny through comparative research: case 
studies of particular leaders over time, studies of leaders in similar and different institutional 
and situational contexts. Comparative case study analysis can offer a conceptual map of 
interpretive possibilities in understanding, studying and comparing the political fortunes and 
legacies of different political leaders. This could include leaders who maintain leadership 
capital over long periods of time, through communication and strong links to allies and 
supporters, particularly those who cultivate ‘national’ images. There are also those that 
rapidly lose it (such as Gerald Ford or Gordon Brown) or those who diminish it by staying 
too long (a Thatcher or second term Churchill).  
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Third, a particularly interesting area is the rare leader able to ‘bounce back’ and retrieve or 
recoup, at least to some extent, leadership capital lost. Tenacious ‘comeback’ leaders such as 
Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton, Francois Mitterrand or John Howard belie the notion of the 
inverted U as the only possible shape of a leadership capital trajectory. Enoch Powell may 
have been right with his famous observation that all political lives end in failure, but some 
leaders have a way of acquiring a new lease of life when most observers have already 
declared them politically dead. How and why that happens in some cases and not in others is 
a fascinating puzzle that LCI-analysis is well suited to address. 
In sum, the LCI has the potential to provide a rich, nuanced, comparative and diachronic 
analysis of political leadership. It taps into relational rather than trait- or competency-based 
theories of leadership, which fits the larger development of the political leadership studies 
field (Helms 2012a; Strangio et al 2013; Rhodes and ‘t Hart 2014). Thinking about leadership 
in terms of capital and doing the hard yards of actually trying to measure it over time can help 
rid us of the shadows of ‘Great Man’ and other leader-centric theories of leadership that have 
dominated the field for decades but have yielded surprisingly little robust knowledge helpful 
to political scientists.   
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